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LETTER OF CREDIT LITIGATION-BANK LIABILITY FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages punish defendants for malicious conduct and pre-
sumably deter others from acting similarly.' Punitive damage liability in
purely business lawsuits is particularly controversial.2 Some authorities
argue that the availability of punitive damages discourages legitimate
commercial conduct,3 while others contend that punitive damages deter
egregious conduct.4 Recent letter of credit litigation raised the issue of
whether punitive damages are available under the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC).5
1. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3.9, at 205 (1973); W. Keeton,
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2, at 9-10
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Prosser and Keeton]. Before the question of punitive
damages goes to the jury, the plaintiff must prove serious misconduct. D. Dobbs, supra,
§ 3.9, at 204. The defendant must have acted maliciously, recklessly, wantonly or with
gross negligence demonstrating an indifference to the safety or the rights of others. Id.
§ 3.9, at 205-06. Four states prohibit punitive damage awards. See City of Lowell v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 269, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943) (puni-
tive damages prohibited unless authorized by statute); Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123,
124, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1975) (punitive damages prohibited); Bruton v. Leavitt Stores
Corp., 87 N.H. 304, 305, 179 A. 185, 186 (1935) (same); Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash.
2d 894, 898, 246 P.2d 853, 855 (1952) (punitive damages prohibited unless authorized by
statute).
2. See C. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior
31-32 (1976). Punitive damages against corporations are increasing in frequency and in
amount. See Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1113-15, 427 N.E.2d
608, 616-17 (1981); Note, The Publicly Held Corporation and the Insurability of Punitive
Damages, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1383, 1383 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Insurability of
Punitive Damages].
3. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L
Rev. 1, 69-71 (1982); Insurability of Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1388-89. When
punitive damages are assessed vicariously against a corporation, the employer himself did
nothing to warrant punishment, and the potential for liability may not induce employers
to screen or train employees more carefully. See Ellis, supra, at 69. The loss falls on the
public through the increased cost of goods or on the shareholders, both of whom are
innocent. Id. at 69-70.
4. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 820, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 389 (1981) ("It is precisely because monetary penalties under government regula-
tions prescribing business standards or the criminal law are so inadequate and ineffective
as deterrents against a manufacturer and distributor of mass produced defective products
that punitive damages must be of sufficient amount to discourage such practices."); Kel-
say v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 187, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978) (where criminal
sanctions "would do little to discourage the practice of retaliatory discharge," punitive
damages are appropriate).
5. See, e.g., Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 757
F.2d 399, 407-10 (1st Cir. 1985); Hubbard Business Plaza v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins.
Co., 596 F. Supp. 344, 345-47 (D. Nev. 1984); see also Auto Servicio San Ignacio v.
Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 765 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (5th Cir. 1985)
(court did not permit tort liability against confirming bank); Instituto Nacional de
Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F.
Supp. 279, 281-85 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (tort liability claim against confirming bank permitted
in action by customer).
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The letter of credit6 developed in international transactions as a means
of lessening risks to both buyer and seller.' Letters of credit are commer-
cially desirable because they promote certainty in transactions, thereby
eliminating the barrier of distrust between distant or unfamiliar parties.'
6. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) defines a "letter of credit" or "credit" as
"an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request of a customer. . . that
the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the
conditions specified in the credit." U.C.C. § 5-103(l)(a) (1977); see H. Harfield, Bank
Credits and Acceptances 29-33 (5th ed. 1974); J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 18-2, at 711-15 (2d ed. 1980); see also Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-
its (UCP), art. 2 (Publ. No. 400) (rev. ed. 1983) (the UCP may also govern letter of credit
law) [hereinafter cited as UCP]. For a discussion of the applicability of the UCC and the
UCP, see infra note 13.
7. See A. Lowenfeld, International Private Trade § 1.2 (rev. ed. 1977). The need for
an assured payment gave rise to the letter of credit. See Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1970); Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co.,
197 Misc. 431, 441-42, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787-88 (Sup. Ct. 1949); J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 6, § 18-1, at 704-08; Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 Ariz.
L. Rev. 239, 241 (1982). Essentially, the issuer's credit is substituted for the customer's
credit. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550,
552-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka,
415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa. 1976); H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 27.
8. Without a letter of credit, the seller would not want to ship the goods until receiv-
ing payment. The seller prefers to avoid the risk of the buyer's insolvency, rejection of
the goods or refusal to pay. In these scenarios, the seller might have to accept less than
the contract price, try to find another purchaser, pay extra transportation charges, or sue,
possibly in a foreign or unfamiliar jurisdiction. On the other hand, the buyer is reluctant
to prepay before shipment because of the chance that he will either not receive the goods
or receiving nonconforming goods, leaving him in the same undesirable position as the
seller who does not receive payment. With the letter of credit, both parties can reduce or
eliminate risk of nonpayment and nondelivery of goods. See Kingdom of Sweden v. New
York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441-42, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787-88 (Sup. Ct. 1949); J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-1; Harfield, supra note 7, at 241; Justice, Letters
of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations-Part 1, 94 Banking L.J. 424, 427-28 (1977).
The customer specifies the documents the beneficiary must obtain before receiving pay-
ment, such as a bill of lading, thus giving the customer some evidence that the goods were
shipped. For additional protection, the customer can require that a neutral third party
inspect the goods and certify their conformance with the requirements of the underlying
contract. The customer is likely to require an inspection certificate because without it the
seller/beneficiary will receive payment on the letter of credit before the customer can
examine the goods. The beneficiary knows that by shipping the goods and obtaining the
required documents, the issuer's obligation to pay is triggered. Moreover, banks are
likely to remain solvent. The seller also has the protection of holding the documents
controlling the goods until the issuer pays. Thus, the buyer cannot receive the goods
until the issuer pays. See J. Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and
Standby Credits 1 3.07[5], at 3-28 (1984); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-1,
at 707; Harfield, supra note 7, at 241. Moreover, both parties benefit from the issuer's
experience in checking document conformity. The bank's objective role promotes a
greater willingness by a buyer and seller to enter into a contract, particularly where the
parties are geographically distant and thus may have difficulty monitoring the other
party's financial status. See A. Lowenfeld, International Private Trade 77, § 5.3, at 130
(2d ed. 1981).
The issuer paying the draft acquires documents of title to the goods, thereby securing a
reimbursement claim against the buyer. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-
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If a contract requires a letter of credit, the buyer, known as the cus-
tomer,9 obtains a letter of credit from its bank, called the issuer,'0
designating the seller as beneficiary." The letter of credit obligates the
issuer to pay the beneficiary when the beneficiary presents certain docu-
ments relating to the transaction. If the documents conform to those
required by the letter, the issuer must pay the beneficiary without regard
to the underlying sales contract. 2
Article 5 of the UCC, governing letters of credit,' 3 also governs the
standby letter of credit. 4 In the typical standby letter of credit, the bene-
1, at 707-08. If an issuer wants greater protection against its customer, it can also require
additional collateral or a deposit to cover the letter of credit payment. See id. at 708 n. 11.
9. The "'customer' is a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to issue a
credit." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1977). The customer is sometimes referred to as an ac-
credited buyer, importer, consignee or account party. H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 33.
10. The "'issuer' is a bank or other person issuing a credit." U.C.C. § 5-103(l)(c)
(1977). While this definition indicates that an issuer need not be a bank, the issuer must
be a party of known solvency for the letter of credit to function properly. See B.
Kozolchyk, Commercial Letters of Credit in the Americas § 1.01[3], at 9 (1966). In fact,
Article 5 was revised to specifically allow nonbank issuers. J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 6, § 18-1, at 710 & n.18. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of issuers
are banks and this Note focuses exclusively on bank liability.
11. The "'beneficiary' of a credit is a person who is entitled under its terms to draw
or demand payment." U.C.C. § 5-103(l)(d) (1977).
12. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977) states that "[ain issuer must honor a draft or demand
for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether
the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract
between the customer and the beneficiary." Similarly, U.C.C. § 5-109(1)(a) (1977) pro-
vides that "[a]n issuer's obligation to its customer. . . unless otherwise agreed does not
include liability or responsibility (a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale
or other transaction between the customer and the beneficiary ...." The letter of credit
is a separate agreement, independent of the underlying transaction between the customer
and the beneficiary. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2, at 711-12.
13. The UCP may also govern letters of credit. Parties to a letter of credit transaction
may specify that the UCP applies. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1977); J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 6, § 18-3, at 717.
Additionally, New York, Alabama and Missouri have added a fourth subsection to
§ 5-102 of their versions of the UCC. Section 5-102(4) provides as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a letter of credit or a
credit if by its terms or by agreement, course of dealing or usage of trade such
letter of credit or credit is subject in whole or in part to the Uniform Customs
and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits ...
N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1964); see Ala. Code § 7-5-102(4) (1984); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 400.5-102(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Since New York is the leading letter of credit
state, J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-3, at 718, this clause assumes even
greater importance. When the provisions of the UCP are silent on a particular issue,
courts will tend to look to the UCC or pre-Code law. J. White & R. Summers, supra note
6, § 18-3, at 720; see United Bank v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254,
258 n.2, 360 N.E.2d 943, 947-48 n.2, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269-70 n.2 (1976).
14. The standby letter of credit is "any letter of credit. . . which represents an obli-
gation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer. . . to make payment on account of any
indebtedness undertaken by the account party, or. . .to make payment on account of
any default by the account party in the performance of an obligation." 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.1160(a) (1982); see McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit & Penalty Clauses An
Unexpected Synergy, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1982).
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ficiary, who is unfamiliar with the issuer'5 requires a familiar bank to
serve as the confirming bank, 6 which agrees to pay the face value of the
letter of credit, only on default by its customer 17 -the original issuer-or
on failure of performance in the underlying contract.'" Thus, the
standby letter of credit is the functional equivalent of a guarantee.' 9
Although both parties benefit from the transaction, the letter of credit
often performs an important forum-shifting function in favor of the bene-
15. The confirming bank provides additional security of payment to the beneficiary
because the confirming bank becomes directly obligated on the letter. See U.C.C. § 5-
107(2) (1977) (confirming bank assumes obligations of issuing bank); id. § 5-115 (benefici-
ary's remedy if issuer wrongfully dishonors); H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 44-45; J. White
& R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-1, at 707; id. § 18-2, at 713.
16. A " 'confirming bank' is a bank which engages either that it will itself honor a
credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be honored by the issuer
or a third bank." U.C.C. § 5-103(l)() (1977).
17. "The term [customer] also includes a bank which procures issuance or confirma-
tion on behalf of that bank's customer." Id. § 5-103(l)(g).
18. There may be other parties involved in the letter of credit transaction. An advis-
ing bank, see id. § 5-103(l)(e), for example, is a party who facilitates a letter of credit but
has limited liability. See J. Dolan, supra note 8, 1.03, at 1-11 (1984); T. Quinn, Uniform
Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest I 5-103[A][4], at 5-15 (1978). The ad-
vising bank communicates the fact of issuance and the terms of the letter of credit and is
usually located in the beneficiary's locale. See J. Dolan, supra note 8, 1 1.03, at 1-11; T.
Quinn, supra, I 5-103[A][4], at 5-15. The advising bank communicates the fact of issu-
ance and the terms of the letter of credit and is usually located in the beneficiary's locale.
See J. Dolan, supra note 8, 1 1.03, at 1-11; T. Quinn, supra, 5-103[a][4], at 5-15. The
advising bank assumes no liability with respect to the credit except to transmit the infor-
mation accurately. See U.C.C. § 5-107(1) (1978); U.C.P. art. 8; 2 A. Squillante & J.
Fonseca, The Law of Modem Commercial Practices § 7:3, at 229 (rev. ed. 1981); id.
§ 7:7, at 234. The advising bank assumes the obligation of accuracy of its own state-
ments. U.C.C. § 5-107(1) (1977). Issues concerning the liability of the advising bank and
the liability of another party to the advising bank are beyond the scope of this Note.
19. See Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 394 (D. Md.
1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, at 709;
McLaughlin, supra note 14, at 6. A guaranty and a letter of credit do differ in certain
ways. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2, at 713-14. A guarantor becomes
liable only after the obligor does not pay, whereas the confirming bank is primarily liable
on the letter. See, e.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224,
1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Consolidated Aluminum
Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 394 n.23 (D. Md. 1982), aft'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th
Cir. 1983); see U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977) (confirming bank becomes directly obligated on
the credit as though it were the issuer); id. § 5-109 (issuer responsible for documents only,
not underlying facts). Moreover, the guarantor becomes obligated only when the princi-
pal debtor actually defaults; the issuer, however, must pay as long as the documents
presented conform to the terms of the letter, regardless of the underlying facts. See, e.g.,
Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); J. White, & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2, at 713; see also
U.C.C. §§ 5-107, -109 (1977). These differences are significant because a national bank is
not permitted to issue a guaranty. See Kimen v. Atlas Exch. Nat'l Bank, 92 F.2d 615,
617-18 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 650 (1938); Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule
and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 Banking L.J. 46, 61-62 (1979); see also
12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982) (enumerated powers of a national bank do not include power to
issue guaranties).
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ficiary.2 ° Without the letter, the customer could withhold payment in
the event of a dispute. The beneficiary would then have to sue the cus-
tomer, possibly in a foreign jurisdiction. With a letter, however, the is-
suer must pay the beneficiary if the documents conform, despite any
disagreement concerning the underlying contract. The beneficiary thus
becomes the stakeholder. If a dispute arises, execution of the letter forces
the customer to sue the beneficiary.2'
Because the drafters of the UCC realized that the commercial develop-
ment of letters of credit required flexible legal rules,' the UCC is some-
what ambiguous with respect to the range of remedies available to the
parties to a letter of credit transaction. In fact, Article 5 specifically
prescribes a remedy only when the beneficiary sues the issuer or confirm-
ing bank.23 When an issuer or confirming bank wrongfully dishonors a
demand for payment, section 5-115 permits the beneficiary to recover the
face amount of the letter plus incidental damages, less any amount
realized by resale.24 The Code defines the bank's obligations to the
customer-to examine the documents "with care"'2 and in good
20. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-1, at 706-07; McLaughlin, supra
note 14, at 5.
21. Weisz & Blackman, Standby Letters of Credit After Iran: Remedies of the Ac-
count Party, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 355, 375; see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank,
N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (burden of bringing suit is shifted to
buyer).
22. The drafters recognized that
no statute can effectively or wisely codify all the possible law of letters of credit
without stultifying further development of this useful financing device....
[Section 5-102](3) makes explicit the court's power to apply a particular rule by
analogy to cases not within its terms, or to refrain from doing so. Under Sec-
tion 1-102(1) such application is to follow the canon of liberal interpretation to
promote underlying purposes and policies. Since the law of letters of credit is
still developing, conscious use of that canon and attention to fundamental the-
ory by the court are peculiarly appropriate.
U.C.C. § 5-102 official comment 2 (1977).
23. Id. § 5-115. Although the parties may sue on the underlying contracts, a primary
reason for using the letter of credit is to avoid lawsuits on the underlying contract. See J.
White & R Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at 728. The customer and issuer also have a
contract providing that the issuer will issue the letter, and the customer will reimburse
the issuer for payments under the letter. Id § 18-7, at 741.
24. U.C.C. § 5-115(1) (1977). If no resale is made, the documents, goods or other
subject matter must be turned over to the issuer on payment of the judgment. Id.
25. Id. § 5-109(2); see United States v. Sun Bank, 609 F.2d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam); Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Courtaulds N. Am.,
Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 100 (M.D.N.C.), rey'd on other
grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975). Even if the issuer wrongfully honors and has
failed to examine the documents "with care," the customer may not have a good claim
against the issuer if their contract has a clause providing that the bank would not be
responsible for the validity, sufficiency or genuineness of the documents. Courts have
generally upheld such clauses. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, at 741.
Nevertheless, the issuer should not be able to disclaim contractually its duty of care to
its customer. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1977). The parties may, however, determine stan-
dards of performance, provided such standards are not "manifestly unreasonable." Id.;
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faithZ6 -but omits a remedy for the customer if the issuer breaches these
duties.27 A confirming bank assumes the obligations of an issuer,2  but
courts interpret a confirming bank's duty to run only to the issuer-the
confirming bank's customer-and not to the ultimate customer.2 9
Article 5 is silent on punitive damages. Consequently, the question of
punitive damages arises only if the UCC permits remedies in addition to
those prescribed by Article 5.3" Article 1 provides that the UCC does
not automatically preempt all common law rights and obligations of par-
ties to a commercial transaction. 3' It also states that the remedies of the
Code shall be "liberally administered" 32 for the purpose of putting the
aggrieved party in the same position it would have been had the other
party performed fully.33 Although this provision emphasizes compensa-
tion,34 it also states that punitive damages may be awarded if specifically
see J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, at 742; Farrar, Incidents of Improper Perform-
ance, in Letters of Credit and Bankers' Acceptances 1985, 413, at 415.
In a provision similar to U.C.C. § 5-109(2), the UCP states that "[blanks must examine
all documents with reasonable care to ascertain that they appear on their face to be in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit." U.C.P. art. 15.
26. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 5-109(1) (1977) (Code definition of "good faith"); H.
Harfield, supra note 6, at 57.
27. This silence is probably due to the fact that lawyers for issuers greatly influenced
the drafting of Article 5. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-7, at 741 (citing
Rudolph B. Schlesinger's critique of the 1952 official text of Article 5 for the New York
Law Revision Comm'n, 1955 Report 1571-1719, at 1630 (1955)).
The customer is not left without a remedy if the issuer wrongfully dishonors. He can
sue the beneficiary for breach of the underlying contract or for breach of warranty under
§ 5-111, but there are risks involved. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. In fact,
the customer may have sought the letter of credit to avoid these risks, such as beneficiary
insolvency or litigation in a foreign jurisdiction. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text. Alternatively, the customer can sue the issuer for breach of their reimbursement
contract. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
28. U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977); see Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 545 F. Supp. 301, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1983); Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola
(Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282 (N.D. I1.
1982); H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 9-10, 255.
29. See Auto Servicio San Ignacio, S.R.L. v. Compania Anonima Venezolana de
Navegacion, 765 F.2d 1306, 1308 (5th Cir. 1985); Dulien Steel Prods. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), af'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); Linden v.
National City Bank, 12 A.D.2d 69, 70-71, 208 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (1960); Courteen Seed
Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 A.D. 495, 498, 215 N.Y.S. 525, 528-
29 (1926), affid, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
30. See infra notes 82-107, 112-144 and accompanying text.
31. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977) states that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions
of this Act, the principles of law and equity. . . shall supplement its provisions." There-
fore, common law applies unless the Code displaces it.
32. Id. § 1-106(1).
33. Id. Section 1-106(1) states:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages
may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.
34. Id. § 1-106 official comment 1 (one of the purposes of subsection (1) is "to make it
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provided for in the UCC or by "other rule of law."35 Because Article 5
does not mention punitive damages, a letter of credit litigant may receive
a punitive remedy only if it is available under some "other rule of law." 3
6
Under common law, punitive damages are awarded only when the de-
fendant has acted in an outrageous manner 37 and are most frequently
awarded in tort actions.3" Traditionally, punitive damages were not al-
lowed in breach of contract actions.39 More recently, however, courts
have allowed punitive damages in contractual disputes involving separate
tort claims.' Additionally, if the breach of contract is committed in a
tortious manner, courts may award punitive damages.4
These common law causes of action are available in letter of credit
litigation only if they do not thwart the purposes of the Code.4" Even if
an appropriate cause of action meets this standard, punitive damages are
not automatically available. Punitive damages are permitted only if they
themselves do not thwart the purposes of the Code.43
This Note will explore if and when an issuing bank or a confirming
bank can be held liable for punitive damages in letter of credit litigation.
Part I analyzes the interplay between common law and the UCC and
concludes that common law liability may arise in letter of credit disputes,
thereby raising the theoretical possibility of punitive damages as a rem-
clear that compensatory damages ... do not include consequential or special damages,
or penal damages").
35. Id. § 1-106.
36. Id § 1-106(1).
37. See Memphis Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 F. 835, 843 (6th Cir.
1916); Otto Kuehne Preserving Co. v. Allen, 148 F. 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1906); Collens v.
New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 489, 234 A.2d 825, 832 (1967); Ross v. Gore, 48
So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1950); Harrington v. Hadden, 69 Idaho 22, 23, 202 P.2d 236, 237
(1949); Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 61 A.D.2d 491, 494, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1978); D.
Dobbs, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 204-05; Prosser and Keeton, supra note 1, § 2, at 9-10.
38. C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 77, at 276 (1935); Prosser and Keeton, supra
note 1, § 2, at 9.
39. See Thompson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 83 F. Supp. 656, 660
(N.D. Iowa 1949); J. J. White, Inc. v. Metropolitan Merchandise Mart, Inc., 48 Del. 526,
527, 107 A.2d 892, 894 (1954); Den v. Den, 222 A.2d 647 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966); J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law Of Contracts § 14-3, at 520 (2d ed. 1977); Prosser and
Keeton, supra note 1, § 2, at 9-10.
40. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 14-3, at 520; D. Dobbs, supra note 1,
§ 12.4, at 818. If the plaintiff can prove an independent willful tort with the requisite
outrageous conduct, punitive damages are permitted. See, eg., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gibbs,
340 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 354 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1976);
Kuiken v. Garrett, 243 Iowa 785, 790, 51 N.W.2d 149, 158 (1952); Mabery v. Western
Casualty & Surety Co., 173 Kan. 586, 593, 250 P.2d 824, 830 (1952) (quoting Moffet v.
Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 52, 57, 244 P.2d 228, 233 (1952)); Ameri-
can Ry. Exp. Co. v. Bailey, 142 Miss. 622, 623, 107 So. 761, 763 (1926); see D. Dobbs,
supra note 1, § 12.4, at 818.
41. See Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974); Vernon Fire & Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 316 N.E.2d 381, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Isagholian v. Carnegie Inst.,
51 Mich. App. 220, 222, 214 N.W.2d 864, 865 (1974); E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8,
at 842-43 (1982).
42. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
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edy. Part II then discusses whether allowing punitive damages would
thwart UCC policies relating to letters of credit. This Note concludes
that punitive damages should be permitted in limited circumstances be-
cause they would not thwart UCC policies and, in some cases, would
promote secure use of letters of credit.
I. INTERPLAY BETWEEN COMMON LAW AND THE UCC
Section 1-103 provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provi-
sions of [the UCC], the principles of law and equity . . . shall supple-
ment its provisions."'  Accordingly, common law remedies for tort and
breach of contract, and thus punitive damages, apply in letter of credit
litigation as long as the Code does not provide the exclusive remedy.4"
Although section 1-106 permits punitive damages by "other rule of
law,"'4 6 section 1-103 may nevertheless displace that other rule of law.47
Section 1-103 therefore modifies section 1-106 and precludes punitive
damages if the UCC displaces the underlying substantive claim.48
Although the UCC displaces common law only when common law
conflicts with UCC policy,4 9 determining such an inconsistency can be
difficult. The Code's express intent to supplement it provisions with
common law,5" to be "liberally construed" 51 to promote its underlying
44. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977).
45. See infra notes 72-144 and accompanying text.
46. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1977).
47. Id. § 1-103. See infra notes 49-55.
48. See McLaughlin, Letters of Credit: Some Recent Cases, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1985,
at 1, col. 1. Unfortunately, decisions discussing the availability of punitive damages for
common law liability under § 1-106 fail to first expressly perform a § 1-103 analysis to
determine if the Code displaces that substantive common law. See, e.g., Siegman v. Equi-
table Trust Co., 267 Md. App. 309, 315 n.3, 297 A.2d 758, 761 n.3 (1972) (dictum)
(punitive damages permissible for conversion because § 1-106 permitted them and § 4-
402 did not expressly preclude them); Davidson v. First Bank & Trust Co., 609 P.2d
1259, 1262-63 (Okla. 1977) (punitive damages permitted for conversion because bank
sold repossessed collateral in commercially unreasonable manner); Z.D. Howard Co. v.
Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Okla. 1975) (punitive damages permitted for material
misrepresentation and breach of warranty under UCC because breach amounted to in-
dependent tort); Clayton v. Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Utah 1982)
(punitive damages permitted under § 1-106 for repossession of goods because the defend-
ant's conduct was wilful and malicious).
The few letter of credit cases dealing with the issue of punitive damages also fail to
explicitly use a § 1-103 analysis. See Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Nat'l Bank, 757 F.2d 399, 407-11 (1st Cir. 1985); Hubbard Business Plaza v. Lin-
coln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 344, 346-47 (D. Nev. 1984). Although some
courts indirectly perform a § 1-103 analysis by examining UCC policy, without a system-
atic analysis, it is difficult for banks and other business entities to conform their conduct
to legal standards.
49. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
50. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977).
51. See id. § 1-102(2). The underlying purposes and policies of the U.C.C. are "to
simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;. . . to per-
mit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agree-
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purposes and policies,52 and to provide flexibility in commercial transac-
tions 3 should govern this analysis. Thus, under section 1-103, the Code
should displace common law only if a UCC provision expresses a specific
intent to displace the common law,54 or if the application of common law
would thwart Code policy. 5 If the Code is silent concerning the applica-
tion of a particular common law rule, that rule should apply unless it
thwarts UCC policy. Accordingly, unless permitting punitive damages
would thwart the purposes and policies of Article 5, or of the UCC as a
whole, they should be available if common law permits them.
The drafters intended Article 5 to set an "independent theoretical
frame" for the development of letters of credit 6 and emphasized their
commercial utility as a reason for construing the UCC to promote their
development. 7 Encouraging the use of letters of credit concomitantly
promotes a primary purpose of Article 1-to "permit the continued ex-
pansion of commercial practices."58 To determine whether the availabil-
ity of punitive damages would thwart this policy, the unique nature of a
letter of credit must be considered.
The issuing bank oversees documents, not the goods themselves or the
facts represented by the documents.5 9 In deciding whether to honor a
ment of the parties; ... [and] to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. § 1-102 official comment 1.
54. See Brannon v. First Nat'l Bank, 137 Ga. App. 275, 278, 223 S.E.2d 473, 476
(1976); Demos v. Lyons, 151 N.J. Super. 489, 493, 376 A.2d 1352, 1357 (1976); Gorge
Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co., 493 P.2d 782, 787 (Wash. App. 1972). Even if a
provision specifically expresses an intent to displace common law, one could still argue
that it should apply if it would promote the purposes and policies of the Code. The
drafters have explicitly approved a similar argument in § 1-102 official comment 1. The
drafters emphasized the importance of policy in interpreting Article 5 by specifically di-
recting the reader back to § 1-102. See iL § 5-102 official comment 2.
55. See Childs v. Federal Reserve Bank, 719 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1983); New
Jersey Bank, N.A. v. Bradford Secs. Oper., Inc., 690 F.2d 339, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1982);
First Ga. Bank v. Webster, 168 Ga. App. 307, 308, 308 S.E.2d 576, 578 (1983); R. Ander-
son, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-103 (2d ed. 1971).
56. U.C.C. § 5-101 official comment (1977); see also id. § 5-102 official comment 2
("The rules embodied in the Article can be viewed as those expressing the fundamental
theories underlying letters of credit.").
57. See id. § 5-102 official comment 2.
58. Id. § 1-102(2)(b); see id. § 5-102 official comment 2.
59. See id. §§ 5-109(1), (2), -114(1); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2, at
711-12. The issuer must honor a presentment that conforms to the requirements of the
letter, even if the goods themselves do not conform to the terms of the underlying con-
tract. E.g., East Girard Sav. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602
(5th Cir. 1979); Asociacion de Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank,
423 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp.
776, 780 (D. Conn. 1980); cf Banco di Roma v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 464 F. Supp.
817, 824 (D.N.J. 1979) (bank not required to honor nonconforming draft even though
goods conformed to underlying contract).
There is a "fraud in the transaction" exception to the issuer's obligation to pay. See
U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1977). In an extreme case, such as a beneficiary making a demand for
payment after shipping worthless goods, an issuer may, in good faith, choose to honor or
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beneficiary's demand solely by examining the facial conformity of the
documents,60 the issuer performs a ministerial function. 6' The minimal
fee charged by the issuer reflects a commercial understanding of the is-
suer's limited function and risk.6" Most importantly, letter of credit law
is governed by the independence principle,63 which provides that the let-
ter is separate and independent from other agreements involved in the
transaction.' Thus, a letter of credit is essentially a payment guarantee
for the beneficiary, provided he presents conforming documents.6- The
issuer has no duty or liability relating to the underlying transaction.66
The bank's independent obligation to pay gives the letter of credit its
commercial vitality.67 Whether imposing tort or contract liability will
deter the use of letters of credit should determine whether such liability is
inconsistent with the policies of the Code. 68 This determination will dif-
not. See id. § 5-1 14(2)(b). The customer is also permitted to seek a court injunction so
that the issuer does not have to pay. See id. If a holder in due course makes the demand,
however, this exception does not apply. See id. § 5-114(2)(a).
60. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977) provides that
[a]n issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the
terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents con-
form to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer
and the beneficiary. The issuer is not excused from honor. . . by reason of an
additional general term that all documents must be satisfactory to the issuer,
but an issuer may require that specified documents must be satisfactory to it.
61. The issuer does not have discretion in determining whether to honor the benefici-
ary's draft. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d
Cir. 1979); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1977); Data
Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. Conn. 1980); Far E. Tex-
tile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
Litigation over the issue of documentary compliance occurs frequently. State of N.Y.
Law Revision Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code: Article 5-Documentary
Letters of Credit, Legislative Doc. No. 65(F), at n. 167 (1955), reprinted in 3 State of N.Y.
Law Revision Comm'n for 1955, at 1632 & n.167. Although the Code merely requires
that the documents "comply" with the terms of the letter, the majority of states follow a
"strict" compliance rule, a lesser standard than literal compliance. See H. Harfield, supra
note 6, at 73-74; McLaughlin, Letters of Credit: Some Recent Cases, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29,
1985, at 6, col. 4. For a summary of the law on this point, see Bank of Cochin Ltd. v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 83 Civ. 1767, slip op. at 9-11 (S.D.N.Y., July 9,
1985); Note, Letters of Credit: The Role of Issuer Discretion in Determining Documentary
Compliance, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1519, 1523 (1985). There is a statutory exception to
the bank's obligation to pay on the beneficiary's presentment of conforming documents.
See supra note 59.
62. See U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment 1 (1977).
63. See Arbest Constr. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 83-1961, slip op. at 6,
8 (10th Cir. Nov. 19, 1985); Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank, 687 F.2d 1257, 1261
(8th Cir. 1982); Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 83 Civ.
1767, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1985); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2,
at 711-12; Harfield, supra note 7, at 241-42.
64. The "fraud in the transaction" exception represents a deviation from the indepen-
dence principle. See supra note 59.
65. The fraud in the transaction may operate even if the beneficiary presents appar-
ently conforming documents. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
66. But see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
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fer in certain respects, depending on who is suing whom.
A. Beneficiary v. Issuer and Beneficiary v. Confirmer
The Code explicitly provides a remedy to the beneficiary if the issuer
wrongfully dishonors.69 This remedy displaces a breach of contract
cause of action. 0 If the bank's conduct consists of more than just wrong-
ful dishonor, however, the UCC should permit a tort cause of action.7
1. The Code Displaces a Common Law Contract Action
A common law contract action appears to be inconsistent with Article
5 and should be displaced by the Code. Because the letter of credit
evolved as a mercantile specialty entirely separate from common law
contracts, it must be construed as an independent entity.' 2 Within a lim-
ited scope, the drafters intended to set an independent theoretical frame
for the further development of letters of credit." Accordingly, the Code
establishes the purely statutory duties the issuer owes to the benefici-
ary.' A breach of contract claim is coextensive with wrongful dis-
honor,7" for which the Code specifically provides a remedy.' 6
Consequently, the Code displaces a breach of contract action.
Moreover, even if contractual liability would not contravene Code pol-
69. See U.C.C. § 5-115 (1977).
70. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 81-107 and accompanying text.
72. Many New York courts have tended to treat letters of credit as contracts and
have applied general principles of contract law to them. See, eg., RSB Mfg. Corp. v.
Bank of Baroda, 15 Bankr. 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank,
37 N.Y.2d 220, 225-26, 333 N.E.2d 168, 172, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 897-98, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 866 (1975); Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate Chem. Export Ass'n, 100 A.D.2d
165, 172, 473 N.Y.S.2d 403, 409 (1984). A recent Second Circuit opinion recognized,
however, that the letter of credit developed as a "mercantile specialty" distinct from con-
tract law. Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 682
(2d Cir. 1983). The Voest-Alpine decision may change New York law on the issue. See
Shenanigans Knits, Ltd. v. Ameritrust Co. Nat'l Assoc., No. 84 Civ. 8029 (S.D.N.Y. July
30, 1985) (available April 12, 1986, on Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file).
73. See U.C.C. § 5-102(3) & official comment 2 (1977).
74. When the letter is established, see id. § 5-106, the issuer becomes statutorily obli-
gated to the beneficiary. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2, at 711;
Kozolchyk, Letters of Credit, in 9 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law ch. 5,
at 137-40 (1979); see also A. Lowenfeld, supra note 7, § 553, at 103 (although not con-
tractual, beneficiary-issuer relationship has a "well defined set of rights and obligations").
Some courts and some official Code comments suggest a contractual nature to the is-
suer's obligation. See U.C.C. § 5-101 official comment (1977) ("other source of law re-
specting letters of credit is the law of contracts"); id. § 5-114 official comment 1 ("letter
of credit is essentially a contract between the issuer and the beneficiary").
75. A breach of contract claim would be equivalent to a wrongful dishonor cause of
action.
76. See U.C.C. § 5-115(1) (1977). "When an issuer wrongfully dishonors a draft or
demand for payment ... [the beneficiary] may recover ... the face amount of the draft
or demand together with incidental damages . . . less any amount realized by resale
.... " Id. If no resale occurs, the issuer receives the subject matter involved on pay-
ment of the judgment. Id
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icy, the beneficiary cannot establish the essential elements of a contract
claim. First, offer and acceptance do not necessarily occur." The issuer
has no meaningful contact with the beneficiary; in fact, prior to the issu-
ance of a letter of credit, the issuer and beneficiary may be unknown to
each other.78 Furthermore, the Code states that consideration is not nec-
essary to establish a letter of credit.79 Finally, because the issuer cannot
assert against the beneficiary defenses it may have against its customer,
the beneficiary should not qualify as a third party beneficiary of the con-
tract between the customer and issuer. s0 Thus, the issuer's obligations to
a beneficiary are statutory, not contractual, thereby precluding a contract
action.
2. In Certain Circumstances, a Tort Cause of Action
Should Be Permitted
Although the Code displaces a contract claim, an issuer may neverthe-
less be liable to the beneficiary in tort. Section 5-115 arguably prescribes
the beneficiary's sole remedy for wrongful dishonor,"' but that does not
mean that wrongful dishonor is the beneficiary's only cause of action.8 2
Potential tort causes of action could include fraud, 3 civil conspiracy, 4
77. If the issuer anticipatorily repudiates the credit and the beneficiary learns of the
repudiation before procuring the documents, the beneficiary may use the anticipatory
repudiation remedy of a seller in § 2-610. See id. § 5-115(2). "Otherwise the beneficiary
has an immediate right of action for wrongful dishonor." Id.
78. It is the customer who contracts with the issuer for the issuance of the credit. See
supra note 10 and infra note 109 and accompanying text. Offer and acceptance are neces-
sary to form a contract. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 2-1, at 22-23.
79. U.C.C. § 5-105 (1977). It is not expected that a bank would issue a credit without
remuneration, but the beneficiary is not expected to know the amount or to prove such
remuneration. Id. official comment.
80. In an ordinary third party beneficiary situation, the promisor can assert against
the third party beneficiary any defenses that it has against the promisee. See J. Calamari
& J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 17-8, at 623; Restatement of Contracts § 140 (1932). By
comparison, the issuer of a letter of credit cannot assert against the beneficiary any de-
fenses it might have against the customer. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6,
§ 18-2, at 714; Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977).
But see West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (W.D. Pa.
1976) (characterizing letter of credit as third party beneficiary contract) (quoting Harvey
Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Okla. 1974));
Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 98 (M.D.N.C.)
(same), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975).
81. See U.C.C. § 5-115 (1977) (provision gives remedy to beneficiary when issuer
wrongfully dishonors); McLaughlin, supra note 48, at 6, col. 2. But see U.C.C. § 4-402
(1977) ("payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused by the
wrongful dishonor;" liability is limited to actual damages if dishonor caused through
mistake). The two sections are not cross-referenced, however. Therefore, the fact that
§ 5-115 does not explicitly provide for consequential damages does not necessarily mean
they should not be permitted.
82. McLaughlin, supra note 48, at 6, col. 2.
83. A plaintiff claiming a deceit cause of action must prove that a false representation
was made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly with respect to its truth.
See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 1, § 107, at 740.
84. See id. § 46, at 324 for a discussion of the elements of this tort.
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or prima facie tort." Tortious conduct necessarily consists of more than
mere wrongful dishonor.8 6 Depending on the particular tort theory and
the conduct of the bank, the tort cause of action may not thwart the
Code's policy. If tort liability would not thwart the policy of the Code,
courts should permit it if the beneficiary can otherwise establish the
claim.
Concededly, tort claims predicated on wrongful dishonor may
threaten the element of certainty that makes letters of credit commer-
cially desirable.87 In issuing a letter, the bank may assume that its liabil-
ity is limited to the face amount of the letter. 8 Tort liability potentially
undermines this expectation, thus introducing an element of uncertainty
from the bank's perspective.89 Nevertheless, possible tort liability may
discourage issuers from wrongfully dishonoring, thereby enhancing the
beneficiary's certainty of payment.
Any time the bank decides to dishonor, it is deliberately not paying.
Every instance of wrongful dishonor could therefore give rise to potential
tort liability; wrongful dishonor should only subject the issuer to section
5-115 liability.90 Otherwise, the bank would be taking an unforeseeable
risk in issuing the letter of credit. When the bank's conduct consists of
more than just wrongful dishonor, however, imposing tort liability does
not frustrate the bank's reasonable expectations. If the beneficiary can
prove that the issuer and customer conspired not to pay the beneficiary,
the issuer may be liable for the tort of civil conspiracy. 91 When the bank
willfully violates its duty of good faith9" under the letter, tort liability in
excess of the face amount of the letter is reasonably foreseeable. In such
cases, the beneficiary's cause of action should not be limited to section 5-
115.
Because banks could readily abuse the informal procedures employed
in deciding whether to honor the beneficiary's demand,9" tort liability
85. See id. § 130, at 1010-11 for a description of this tort.
86. In order to sue in tort as well as for wrongful dishonor, the beneficiary would
have to prove the elements of a tort claim, as well as a breach of the issuer's duties under
the Code.
87. See H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 108-09.
88. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
89. See H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 108-09.
90. Clearly, the issuer should not be subject to tort liability every time it wrongfully
dishonors. Otherwise, the Code remedy could always be sidestepped. The act of wrong-
ful dishonor would constitute only one of several elements required to establish a valid
tort claim. See supra note 86.
91. See, e.g., Hubbard Business Plaza v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp.
344, 346 (D. Nev. 1984).
92. See U.C.C. § 5-109(1) (1977).
93. The issuer may be subject to a "cross-fire of pressures." J. White & L Summers,
supra note 6, § 18-6, at 731-32 (quoting T. Schlesinger Study, State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n Study of Uniform Commercial Code: Article 5-Documentary Letters of
Credit, 3 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n, 1955 Report, at 1634-35); see Bank of
Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 83 Civ. 1767, slip op. at 11-12
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1985); B. Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
may be particularly appropriate. If the bank decides the beneficiary's
documents do not strictly conform, it must formally notify or return the
draft to the beneficiary94 in order to give him a chance to correct the
problem. In the interest of convenience, however, the issuing bank may
informally ask its customer to waive the nonconformity.95 If the cus-
tomer does so, the issuer will honor the demand without requiring the
beneficiary to revise the nonconforming documents. Although this infor-
mal procedure generally serves the interests of all the parties, the issuer's
allegiance to the customer may translate into collusion. Rather than
merely notifying the customer that it intends to dishonor unless the cus-
tomer waives the discrepancies, the issuer may solicit the customer's ad-
vice in deciding whether to dishonor. In doing so, the issuer surrenders
its independence to the customer's interests, thereby flouting its funda-
mental duty under the Code.96 The availability of a tort action, such as
fraud97 or civil conspiracy, 9s may deter improper communication be-
tween customer and issuer.99 The bank will probably monitor its em-
ployees more carefully to prevent improper communication. Con-
sequently, allowing the beneficiary to sue in tort for this type of issuer
malfeasance does not thwart the purposes of the Code.
This situation is less likely to occur, however, when the beneficiary
presents the documents to a confirming bank. The beneficiary typically
requests a confirming bank in his geographic area when he is unfamiliar
with the issuing bank. "o The confirming bank therefore has ties to the
beneficiary and not to the customer. If the conspiracy scenario does
arise, however, a tort action should be available because a confirming
Cards § 8.5[4], at 8-48 (1981). For example, the customer may insist on dishonor for
microscopic discrepancies, particularly if the price of the underlying goods has dropped
since the time of the contract, while the beneficiary may threaten to sue for wrongful
dishonor. See Bank of Cochin Ltd., slip op. at 11-12; B. Clark, supra, § 8.5[4], at 8-48; J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at 731-32 (quoting Schlesinger Study, State of
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code: Article 5-Documen-
tary Letters of Credit, 3 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n, 1955 Report, at 1634-35).
94. See U.C.C. § 5-112 (1977).
95. The beneficiary is spared the time and inconvenience of curing the documents.
The customer waives the noncompliance if it is immaterial, and receives title to the goods
sooner. The issuer fulfills its function under the Code yet saves the time of checking the
beneficiary's second demand.
96. The issuer's obligation to examine the conformity of the documents independent
of any underlying agreements makes the letter of credit commercially useful. See Bank of
Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 83 Civ. 1767, slip op. at 8
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1985); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 357,
336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975); Justice, supra note 8, at 426-27.
97. See supra note 83.
98. See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 6, § 46, at 324.
99. Without the potential for tort liability, the risk of collusion to the bank is no
greater than the risk of mere wrongful dishonor.
100. See Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 83 Civ. 1767,
slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1985); Note, Confirming Bank Liability in Letter of Credit
Transactions: Whose Bank Is It Anyway?, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 1219, 1220 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Confirming Bank Liability].
(Vol. 54
1986] LETTERS OF CREDIT AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 919
bank assumes the rights and obligations of an issuer. 10'
Another situation justifying tort liability arises when the customer's
financial problems cause the issuer to subordinate its duty to the benefici-
ary to its own interests. If the customer goes bankrupt before the issuer
pays the beneficiary, the issuer may fear it will not be reimbursed by the
customer. Accordingly, the issuer may exaggerate any discrepancies in
the documents presented by the beneficiary and refuse to pay."' 2 This
conduct undermines the essence of the letter of credit."3 If the benefici-
ary can prove the issuer's bad faith in dishonoring, tort liability is appro-
priate because it may discourage banks from wrongfully dishonoring in
bad faith," thus promoting the policies of Article 5.I05
This situation is also unlikely to occur with a confirming bank."0 6 The
confirming bank receives its reimbursement from its customer, the issu-
ing bank, which is less likely to become insolvent than a merchant. " If
the situation does occur, however, the same analysis favors permitting
the beneficiary to sue in tort.
B. Customer v. Issuer
The issuer owes the customer statutory duties of acting in good faith
and examining the documents with care, 108 as well as common law con-
101. See U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977).
102. The beneficiary's initial documents often contain discrepancies. See Leichter &
Harnkik, Strict Compliance Seen Deterring Reliability of Letters of Credit, N.Y.LJ., Sept.
10, 1985, at 5, col. 1, at 6, col. 3, n.20 (citing Marine Midland Bank Study that found that
40% of initial presentations contained discrepancies); McLaughlin, supra note 48, at 6,
col. 4.
103. The independent obligation of the bank to examine the documents regardless of
the underlying facts makes the letter of credit commercially useful. See supra notes 63-67
and accompanying text. In searching for a reason to dishonor, the issuer is not serving its
function of a neutral observer. Because first presentments often contain discrepancies, see
supra note 102, the issuer will often be able to point to a nonconformity as a reason for
dishonor, even if that nonconformity would not normally give rise to dishonor under a
strict compliance standard. A strict compliance standard requires less conformity than a
literal compliance standard. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
105. The underlying policy of Article 5 is to promote the use of letters of credit. See
supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. The primary reason letters of credit work so
well is due to the function of the neutral bank with reputable solvency. See infra note
107.
106. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
107. Because of the seller's distrust of the buyer's creditworthiness, the letter of credit
essentially substitutes the issuer's credit for the buyer's credit. See, eg., Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); H. Ray
Baker, Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550, 552-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F.
Supp. 92, 98 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); H.
Harfield, supra note 6, at 27, 44.
108. U.C.C. §§ 5-109(l)-(2) (1977); see also id. § 5-114(2)(b) (issuer honoring in good
faith may honor demand despite notification).
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tractual duties.'0 9 Article 5, however, is silent with respect to the cus-
tomer's remedies if the issuer wrongfully honors or dishonors. o10 When
the Code expressly establishes a duty but prescribes no remedy for its
violation, common law remedies apply."'I Thus, the violation of a Code
duty may also give rise to common law liability for which punitive dam-
ages are permitted. In that case, if the Code does not displace the com-
mon law claim, punitive damages are theoretically available for wrongful
honor.
1. A Common Law Contract Cause of Action Applies
The issuer owes the customer contractual duties."' To obtain the let-
ter of credit, the customer agrees to reimburse the issuer for amounts
paid under the letter. 13 When the letter is issued, it becomes the con-
tract between the issuer and the customer.' 14 The issuer's liability is thus
based on contract and is governed by common law,' ' but with whatever
limits the UCC may impose.
If the issuer improperly pays on a draft, either because the documents
do not conform or the issuer knowingly accepts false or fraudulent docu-
ments, the issuer breaches both the reimbursement contract and the obli-
gations imposed by section 5-109(2), which are incorporated into the
contract." 6 Because the Code imposes obligations" 7 without specifying
a remedy, allowing common law remedies provides the customer with a
109. See H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 103; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-
7, at 741.
110. See U.C.C. § 5-109 (1977); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-7, at 741.
111. See U.C.C. § 1-106(2) (1977) ("Any right or obligation declared by [the UCC] is
enforceable by action unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited
effect."); accord id. official comment 2 (any right or obligation in Code is enforceable by
court action even though remedy not expressly provided, unless provision states limited
effect).
112. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. These contractual duties incorporate
the standard of care of U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1977). See J. White & R. Summers, supra note
6, § 18-7, at 741.
113. Generally, the reimbursement agreement between the issuer and customer states
that the issuer will issue the letter of credit and the customer will reimburse the issuer for
payments made to the beneficiary pursuant to the letter. Even if the contract does not
discuss reimbursement, the issuer is statutorily entitled to reimbursement, conditioned on
the issuer's "duly" honoring the draft. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1977); accord U.C.P. art. 8; H.
Harfield, supra note 6, at 49-50. An issuer loses its right of reimbursement if the docu-
ments do not facially conform or if it acts in bad faith. See Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977) (if issuing bank pays beneficiary despite non-
compliance, issuer jeopardizes its right to reimbursement from customer); Consolidated
Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 389 n.9 (D. Md. 1982) (same), affid,
704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983).
114. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 112. It is important to note, however, that if the beneficiary skill-
fully forged the documents so that they facially conformed, the customer can only sue the
beneficiary on the underlying agreement and would have no claim against the issuer. See
supra note 59.
117. See U.C.C. § 5-109 (1977). See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 54
19861 LETTERS OF CREDIT AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 921
means of enforcing the issuer's obligations. I' Encouraging the issuer to
act in good faith119 enhances Code policies. Therefore, a breach of con-
tract action should not be displaced by the Code. 2
Moreover, the Code provides that Article 5 does not contain all the
rules governing letters of credit.1 21 Because the customer and issuer have
a contract122 and the UCC does not specify a remedy, common law con-
tract remedies should apply. Accordingly, if the jurisdiction permits pu-
nitive damages in connection with a contract action,"z they are
theoretically available to the customer under the Code.
2. Independent Tort Liability Is Unlikely But Permissible
Similarly, because the Code is silent concerning remedies for violation
of duties owed to the customer,124 any applicable tort causes of action are
not displaced. As a practical manner, however, the issuing bank is un-
likely to incur tort liability in a wrongful honor situation. The issuer
probably has no motive to improperly pay the beneficiary. Not only is
the beneficiary likely to be unknown to the issuer,"z but the issuer would
lose its right to reimbursement from the customer.' 2
6
Additionally, the issuing bank cannot be held liable in tort for mere
wrongful honor. In such a case, the customer should be limited to a
breach of contract cause of action. Otherwise, every wrongful honor
would potentially subject the issuer to tort liability. Furthermore, the
customer could not credibly claim that the issuer was negligent in not
discovering fraud underlying the documents.127 The issuer's obligations
118. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
119. U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1977). The obligation of good faith in § 5-109(2) is defined as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Id. § 1-201(19) & official
comment; see Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 143-44, 428 A.2d 518,
526 (App. Div. 1981). Compare the additional requirements of good faith in U.C.C. § 2-
103(1)(b) (1977) ("observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade") with idL § 7-404 ("observance of reasonable commercial standards"). Mere negli-
gence does not violate the standard of honesty in fact. See Funding Consultants, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 187 Conn. 637, 643, 447 A.2d 1163, 1165-66 (1982); Indus-
trial Natl Bank v. Leo's Used Car Exch., 362 Mass. 797, 801-02, 291 N.E.2d 603, 606
(1973); Community Bank v. Ell, 278 Or. 417, 427-28, 564 P.2d 685, 691 (1977). The
reasonable person standard generally used in negligence claims does not determine good
faith under an honesty in fact standard, see Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v.
Vintero Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1108, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Republic of Tex. Say.
Ass'n v. First Republic Life Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1251, 1255 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 422 So. 2d 161 (La. 1983), and thus is inapplicable to Article 5 litigation.
120. The Code only displaces a common law cause of action if common law would
thwart the Code's policies. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
121. See U.C.C. § 5-102(3) & official comment 2 (1977).
122. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 112-22, 124-44 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
125. The customer contracts with the issuer, not the beneficiary. See supra note 109
and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
127. The issuer is immune from liability for the underlying transaction because it lacks
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to the customer do not include a duty to verify the facts represented in
the documents. 121 If the issuer does commit fraud, however, the cus-
tomer should have a claim in tort.
Accordingly, any applicable common law causes of action are avail-
able to the customer when the issuer breaches a duty imposed by the
Code. If punitive damages are allowed under the particular substantive
claim, the Code should not preclude their availability unless punitive
damages would independently thwart Code policy.
C. Customer v. Confirming Bank
1. No Common Law Contract Cause of Action Exists
Section 5-109 establishes the confirmer's duties to its customer,1 29 the
issuer, but the Code does not specify any duties owed to the ultimate
customer.1 30 The customer does not have a common law contract cause
of action because it lacks privity with the confirming bank.13' The con-
control and, possibly, knowledge of it. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text, and
supra note 119.
128. See supra notes 59-6 1.
129. See U.C.C. §§ 5-107(2), -109 (1977). Because the confirmer assumes the issuer's
duties, id. § 5-107(2), § 5-109 states the confirmer's obligations-good faith and obser-
vance of general banking custom to its customer-as well as the issuer's duty to examine
the documents "with care" in determining facial conformity. See id. § 5-109(2).
130. Courts have interpreted the confirmer's duties as running only to its customer, the
issuer, and not to the ultimate customer. See Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion
Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282-85
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 929
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (dictum), affd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); Linden v. National City
Bank, 12 A.D.2d 69, 70, 208 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (1960). But see Confirming Bank Liabil-
ity, supra note 100, at 1236-43 (advocating extension of Code provisions by analogy and
doing away with the privity requirement).
The definition of "customer" in Article 5 also includes an issuing bank that procures a
confirmation on behalf of its customer. U.C.C. § 5-103(g) (1977). Because § 5-109
speaks of the issuer's duties to its customer, and the confirmer assumes the obligations of
its issuer, and the confirmer's customer is the issuer under the Article 5 definition, the
§ 5-109 duties run toward the confirmer's customer. The issuer contracts with the con-
firming bank. The confirming bank relies on the credit of the issuer, not that of the
ultimate customer. See Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20 F.2d 307,
309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 497 (1927); Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion
Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 283
(N.D. II1. 1982). The confirmer receives reimbursement solely from the issuer. See Kun-
glig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 20 F.2d at 309; Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola
(Indeca), 530 F. Supp. at 283; Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking
Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 382, 157 N.E. 272, 274 (1927).
131. See Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Il1.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282-83 (N.D. I11. 1982); Linden v. National
City Bank, 12 A.D.2d 69, 70, 208 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (1960); see also Dulien Steel Prods.
v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), affd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.
1962). But see Confirming Bank Liability, supra note 100, at 1236-43 (advocating permit-
ting customer to sue confirming bank by eliminating privity requirement).
In pre-Code cases, courts also denied the customer a contract cause of action for lack
of privity. See Oelbermann v. National City Bank, 79 F.2d 534, 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1935),
modified per curiam, 298 U.S. 638 (1936); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City
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firming bank has contracted solely with the initial issuer. 3 2 The con-
firmer's obligations under the Code,' 33 like those of the original issuer,
are independent of the other transactions underlying the letter of
credit,"' including the contract between the customer and issuer.
2. In Certain Limited Situations, a Tort Cause of Action
Should Be Permitted
Although the confirmer's duty generally runs only to the issuer,' 35
these duties should occasionally be construed to run to the customer. It
is possible that the confirming bank can breach its duty of care in exam-
ining the documents without the issuer breaching its duty in honoring
the draft. This situation occurs if the beneficiary fraudulently obtains the
"conforming" documents, and the confirmer honors with knowledge,
either constructive or actual, of the fraud. If the documents appear to
conform when the issuer receives them from the confirmer, the issuer
rightfully reimburses the confirmer, and the customer is required to reim-
burse the issuer.136 The issuer has little incentive to sue the confirmer
because it has already received payment from the customer. Thus, the
issuer's independent duty to inspect documents for facial conformity 31
does not protect the customer from collusion between the confirming
bank and the beneficiary. Because the beneficiary selects the confirmer,
with whom it typically has an ongoing relationship, 3 there is a risk of
collusion.139 In this situation, therefore, the confirming bank's duties
Bank, 20 F.2d 307, 308-09 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 275 U.S. 497 (1927); Courteen Seed Co.
v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 A.D. 495, 499, 215 N.Y.S. 525, 529
(1926), afl'd, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
As a matter of contract law, a person not in privity cannot sue to enforce a contract.
See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 17-1, at 605-06. There is an exception,
however, for third party beneficiaries. Id.
132. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
133. U.C.C. §§ 5-107(2), -109 (1977).
134. Since the confirming bank becomes "directly obligated on the credit ... as
though it were its issuer," U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1978), the independence principle also ap-
plies to the confirming bank's obligation. See Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shang-
hai Banking Corp., 216 A.D. 495, 498, 215 N.Y.S. 525, 528-29 (1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y.
377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
135. See Auto Servicio San Ignacio v. Compania-Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion,
765 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (5th Cir. 1985) (customer not permitted tort cause of action
against confirmer). But see Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 284-85 (N.D. I11. 1982) (cus-
tomer permitted tort cause of action).
136. The issuer, as the confirming bank's customer, must reimburse the confirming
bank for amounts paid on the letter if the documents facially conform. See U.C.C. § 5-
114(3) (1977).
137. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
138. Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 83 Civ. 1767, slip
op. at 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1985).
139. See Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 687 F.2d 1257, 1264-65
(8th Cir. 1982) (issuer did not have to honor draft presented by assignee bank because
bank knew the terms of the letter were not complied with and had contributed in prevent-
ing the underlying contract from being performed); Instituto Nacional de Comercializa-
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should occasionally be construed to run to the customer, and the con-
firmer should be liable in tort to the customer for violating these duties.
Allowing the customer to sue the confirmer in tort does not thwart the
purposes of Article 5. Indeed, because it provides the customer with a
remedy against the otherwise immune confirmer, it enhances the cus-
tomer's interest in using letters of credit. 140  Since confirming banks al-
cion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 281-
82 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (confirming bank knew or should have known the beneficiary's docu-
ments were forged); Confirming Bank Liability, supra note 100, at 1230-31 (confirming
bank often closely allied with beneficiary).
140. In Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. IIl. 1982), the court held that while a
confirming bank could not be held liable to the issuing bank's customer in contract, the
customer could sue in tort under certain circumstances. Id. at 284-85. The beneficiary
had presented the Chicago confirmer with a certificate of origin lacking the necessary
legalization from the Guatemalan Consulate in Miami, Florida. Id. at 281. Later that
afternoon, the beneficiary reappeared with an allegedly legalized certificate. Id. at 281-
82. The confirmer paid the beneficiary and sent the documents to the issuer. Id. at 280.
The documents were in fact forged, and the goods were never sent to Guatemala. Id at
280-81. The court stated that in these circumstances, only the confirming bank could
have discovered the beneficiary's fraud. Id. at 284-85.
At least one commentator severely criticized this decision. See, e.g., Farrar, Letters of
Credit, 38 Bus. Law. 1169, 1176-77 (1983); Farrar, supra note 25, at 420-21. The primary
focus of the commentator's concern was that the court required the confirming bank to
go beyond determining mere facial conformity of the presented documents. See, e.g.,
Farrar, supra, at 1176-78 (1983); Farrar, supra note 25, at 420-21. As a result, the com-
mentator concluded that imposing liability in that situation violated a governing principle
of letter of credit law. See id. The Fifth Circuit also criticized Indeca in Auto Servicio
San Ignacio v. Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 765 F.2d 1306, 1308-09
(5th Cir. 1985).
In Auto Servicio, the customer sued the confirming bank for negligently examining the
documents. Id. at 1308. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
because it interpreted the duty of the confirming bank as running only to the issuer. The
court stated that expanding this liability through tort principles violates the Code's in-
tent. Id. The court gave two policy reasons for its decision. First, allowing the applica-
tion of tort liability would inject uncertainty into letters of credit. Id. This would disrupt
the transaction and is implicitly rejected by the Code. Id. Second, if confirming banks
are held liable to the customer, a party with whom it had never dealt, banks would be
discouraged from confirming a letter. Id. The court distinguished Indeca on the ground
that it involved a tort claim for negligently supervising the revision of documents, while
Auto Servicio involved a tort claim for negligently examining the documents. Id. at 1308-
09.
This distinction is unpersuasive and does not justify different policy decisions. Exam-
ining the revised documents is part of the confirmer's duty to examine the documents
with care and good faith. See U.C.C. § 5-107 (1977) (confirmer assumes obligations of
issuer); id. § 5-109 (issuer must examine documents with care and in good faith).
Although the duties owed in Indeca and Auto Servicio are essentially indistinguishable,
the result in Auto Servicio is nevertheless correct on its facts. The confirmer in Auto
Servicio was merely negligent, but did not breach its duties under the Code. Permitting a
mere negligence cause of action would require a confirmer to go far beyond its proper
function.
Despite the correct result, the Fifth Circuit's holding that a customer never has a direct
cause of action against the confirmer is too broad. In light of the policy enunciated in
Article 1, see supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text, such a cause of action should be
permitted in certain limited situations. In Indeca, the court indicated that the confirmer
did violate its duty of good faith under the Code. Because the confirmer persumably
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ready owe the issuer a duty of examining the documents with care and
good faith, permitting the customer to sue in tort imposes no additional
obligations on the confirming bank. It merely permits another party to
enforce the confirmer's existing obligations when the confirmer would
otherwise be shielded from liability. Because the customer is the party
ultimately harmed by violation of the confirmer's duties, the customer
should be entitled to enforce their performance. Without a remedy, he
may be discouraged from seeking the letter of credit and many potential
transactions may not occur.
Moreover, Article 7 of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Docu-
mentary Credits (UCP)'4 defines the duties of banks, but does not state
to whom these duties are owed. 142  However, Article 12(a) states
"[b]anks [using] the services of another bank for the purpose of giving
effect to the instructions of the applicant for the credit do so for the ac-
count and at the risk of the latter." '43 This language reflects a recogni-
tion that the confirming bank performs its duties for the customer's
protection. Thus, tort liability for harm to the customer does not frus-
trate the confirmer's reasonable expectations.'"
As noted earlier, there may be situations in which the customer has no
recourse against the issuer for the confirmer's wrongful conduct because
the issuer properly performed its obligation. In these situations, allowing
a tort action against the confirmer reinforces the expectations of the par-
ties to the letter, thereby promoting its use. If courts do not permit the
customer a direct cause of action, the confirming bank is essentially im-
mune from liability. The customer would have to absorb the cost of the
confirming bank's bad faith, thereby decreasing the efficiency of letters of
credit. Moreover, denying the customer an action frustrates Code policy
by opening a loophole that may encourage fraudulent conduct. Permit-
ting a tort claim under these circumstances merely closes a gap left by
the Code without increasing the legal burden or economic risk under-
taken by the confirming bank.
knew that the beneficiary forged the documents, the confirmer did not need to look fur-
ther than the facial conformity of the documents. The issuer had no way of detecting the
beneficiary's wrongful activity. Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (In-
deca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 284-85 (N.D. Ill.
1982). In this type of situation, assessing tort liability against a confirmer better achieves
the expectations of the parties to the letter. The confirming bank would essentially be
shielded from liability in this type of situation unless courts do not permit the customer a
direct cause of action.
141. U.C.P. art. 7 states:
Banks must examine all documents with reasonable care to ascertain that they
appear on their face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
credit. Documents which appear on their face to be inconsistent with one an-
other will be considered as not appearing on their face to be in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the credit.
142. See Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental I11.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 283 (N.D. I11. 1982).
143. U.C.P. art. 12.
144. See Confirming Bank Liability, supra note 100, at 1230-31.
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Even if the Code permits these common law causes of action, however,
the availability of punitive damages may nevertheless thwart the pur-
poses of the Code. If so, the Code displaces a punitive damage
remedy. 4 5
II. DESPITE CREATING SOME UNCERTAINTY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
SHOULD BE AVAILABLE IN LIMITED SITUATIONS
Because Article 5 neither specifically authorizes nor prohibits punitive
damages,146 the possibility of punitive liability arises in letter of credit
litigation only if the applicable state law permits them in a business tort
context.147 As noted earlier, many courts and commentators have stated
that punitive liability should not be permitted for business misconduct,
especially when the injury is purely economic. 148 Nevertheless, assuming
that the state whose law governs the action has decided to permit puni-
tive damages, they should be available in letter of credit litigation as long
as punitive liability would not undermine the letter's commercial
utility. 149
A. Punitive Damages Create Some Uncertainty in Letters of Credit
The availability of punitive damages may inject uncertainty into letter
of credit transactions, which rest on objective standards governing
clearly defined expectations and risks.150 Punitive damage liability is in-
herently unpredictable. The amount of punitive damages is within the
jury's discretion.'' Moreover, a plaintiff's attorney may disproportion-
ately influence a jury by appealing to its prejudices against powerful cor-
porate institutions. 5  Additionally, the plaintiff may present evidence of
145. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
151. See Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d 429
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Long, Insurance Protection Against Punitive
Damages, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 573, 580 (1965).
152. See Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation: The Problems of Finding
an Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, I N. Ill. U.L. Rev. 3, 20 (1980). Banks may
be particularly susceptible to such prejudice. In Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 757 F.2d 399 (Ist Cir. 1985), the customer's attorney success-
fully argued in trial court for the jury to
send a message to that [Hospital Trust] Board of Directors across the street....
Send the message to other banks in Rhode Island, and indeed, the world be-
cause this case will be reported inevitably .... If you don't stop this type of
conduct right now, not only for [the plaintiff], but for the lady in Westerly and
the guy in Woonsocket, if you don't stop it, who will?
Id. at 410-11; see Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers
of Defective Products, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1982); Werner, Management, Stock Mar-
ket and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 388, 390
(1977); The Insurability of Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1388-91.
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defendant's wealth on the issue of the amount of punitive damages,' 53
thereby further prejudicing the jury against the bank." Furthermore,
many states do not require the punitive amount to bear any relation to
the compensatory amount.'55 Finally, the vague standards for assessing
punitive damages--conduct that is wanton, gross, outrageous or reck-
less-also contribute to their unpredictability. 56
Any assessment of punitive damages against the issuer may be unfair
in light of the legal understandings and expectations of the parties enter-
ing a letter of credit agreement. The minimal fee charged by the issuer
reflects a commercial understanding that it assumes a minimal obligation
and a commensurately low risk.' This uncertainty makes it very diffi-
cult to incorporate accurately the risk of punitive damages into the eco-
nomic decision to issue a letter of credit. The issuer's obligation is simple
and essentially nondiscretionary: to determine whether the documents
presented by the beneficiary "strictly" conform to the terms of the letter,
a lesser standard than literal compliance.' 58 The potential for punitive
damage liability in connection with low cost, ministerial functions' 59 may
discourage banks from issuing letters of credit. Alternatively, banks may
seek a cushion by charging higher prices for their services. Theoretically,
letters of credit could be priced out of the commercial financing market.
In either case, two of the primary reasons underlying the letter's com-
mercial usefulness, the ease and low cost of establishing the letter, could
be undermined.
153. See, ag., Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 237, 243 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981); Beck v. Dowell, Il1 Mo.
506, 513, 20 S.W. 209, 210 (1892); Lewin, Punitive Costs" Insurance Issue, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 11, 1984, at B2, col. 1. But see Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759,
764 (Ky. 1974) (disallowing evidence of wealth).
154. See DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Products Liability and Profes-
sional Malpractice Cases Bonanza or Disaster, 43 Ins. Couns. J. 344, 351 (1976); Insura-
bility of Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1390 & n.40.
155. See, e.g., Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (en bane); Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So. 2d 622,
626 (Fla. 1977); Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1113, 427 N.E.2d
608, 616 (1981); Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 356,
629 P.2d 196, 207 (1981).
156. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79, 79 (1982);
Ellis, supra note 3, at 36-37.
157. See U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment (1977).
158. See supra note 61. This standard protects the bank to the greatest degree by en-
suring certainty and making its function purely ministerial. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171, 173, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Dulien Steel
Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1962); AMF Head
Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-Am. Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 223, 225
(D. Ariz. 1978) (quoting Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528
F.2d 802, 805 (4th Cir. 1975)); J. Dolan, supra note 8, 4.08[2], at 4-36; Note, Letters of
Credit: A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compliance, 53 Fordham L Rev. 848,
862 (1985); McLaughlin, Letters of Credit and Warehouse Receipts, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 8,
1982, at 1, col. 1.
159. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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B. Despite Uncertainty, Punitive Damages Do Not Thwart
Letter of Credit Use
While these concerns undeniably influence any proper interpretation
of Code policy, the limited potential for punitive liability in letter of
credit disputes diminishes the relevance of economic reasoning to this
particular question. Because punitive damage awards would be rare,
their availability should neither discourage banks from issuing letters nor
encourage them to raise fees appreciably.
Tortious conduct alone does not result in an award of punitive dam-
ages.16 To justify punitive damages, a bank must have acted outra-
geously.1 61  Most banks, however, would not rationally engage in
conduct that would justify a punitive damage award because preserving
their reputation for commercial honor significantly contributes to the
marketability of services such as the letter of credit. 62 Since the Code
already insulates most exercises of discretion by the issuer in determining
whether to honor a letter of credit, 163 only an intentional breach of the
minimal duties assumed by the bank would justify an award of punitive
damages.
Moreover, fears that the availability of punitive damages for business
misconduct may chill economic activity, such as letter of credit financ-
ing, are probably exaggerated. 64 Although not many quantitative stud-
ies concerning punitive damages exist, one recent study indicates that,
contrary to general belief, juries do not routinely award punitive dam-
160. See Shenanigans Knits, Ltd. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., No. 84 Civ. 8029,
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1985) (available Apr. 12, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Decor by Nikkei Int'l v. Federal Rep. of Nig., 497 F. Supp. 893, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(beneficiaries denied punitive damages because they could not prove defendants acted
maliciously), affd, 647 F.2d 300 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1981). See supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
162. See H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 111. Banks generally have a high interest in
maintaining their commercial honor. The Iranian letter of credit cases illustrate this.
Many American companies had contracts with the government of Iran when the Shah
was in power. American banks issued standby letters of credit to pay if the companies
defaulted on their services as judged by the Iranian Ministry of War. When the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini took power, the Ministry claimed that these companies had defaulted on
their performance and submitted the required documents to the American banks. De-
spite intense political pressure, the banks planned to pay until courts began issuing in-junctions. See, e.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 12 (2d
Cir. 1979); Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F. Supp. 1341, 1342-43, 1352 (D. Mass.
1981), aff'd, 730 F.2d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 1982); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United Technologies Corp. v. Ci-
tibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. Bank
Melli Iran, 467 F. Supp. 530, 531-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
163. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
164. See Strasser, Have "Anecdotes, "Not Facts, Fueled Tort Crisis?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24,
1986, at 15. But see DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and
Professional Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 Ins. Couns. J. 344, 345-46
(1976); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69
Va. L. Rev. 269, 271 & n.6 (1983).
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ages against corporate defendants. 165 The mere availability of punitive
damages does not threaten ordinary use of letters of credit because puni-
tive liability arises only in extraordinary situations involving commer-
cially unjustifiable conduct.'66
Although the availability of punitive damages creates uncertainty from
the bank's perspective, the possibility of obtaining insurance against pu-
nitive damages substantially reduces the bank's uncertainty.' 67 In issu-
ing an insurance policy with fixed premiums, the insurance company
assumes the risk of an unforeseeable punitive damage award. Thus, the
bank need only incorporate the cost of the insurance into its decision to
issue the letter of credit. Because these increased costs would be diffused
among all of the bank's letter of credit customers, the increase in price
per letter should be minimal. Moreover, insurance premiums should be
relatively low because the likelihood of punitive damages in letter of
credit disputes is small. 6 Furthermore, the availability of insurance will
not lessen the deterrent value of punitive damages. 69
C. Punitive Damages May Actually Promote UCC Policies
in Some Situations
Not only would the availability of punitive damages not necessarily
impede the growth of letters of credit, it may even promote Code policies
in certain circumstances. Making the beneficiary the stakeholder is an
important function of the letter of credit. 71 Yet, Article 5 probably dis-
places consequential damages as a tort remedy in actions involving
wrongful dishonor.' 7 ' Thus, the potential for punitive liability may en-
hance the beneficiary's certainty of payment by possibly deterring un-
scrupulous banks from wilfully dishonoring.' 72 Similarly, the availability
165. An American Bar Foundation study not yet completed seems to conclude that
prior discussion of problems and crises in punitive damages is based upon the "mega-
cases," which are not typical. See Strasser, supra note 164, at 15. Juries tend to award
punitive damages only in lawsuits involving near-criminal behavior, where such damages
were intended. Id at col. 2.
166. Although an egregious case is rare, it still may occur. When the bank's concern
with its reputation does not provide enough deterrence, punitive damages should be ap-
plied. See Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 757 F.2d
399, 408 (lst Cir. 1985). See infra Part II.C.
167. There is a trend toward the insurability of damages. See Schumnaier & McKinsey,
The Insurability of Punitive Damages, 72 A.B.A. J., March 1, 1986, at 68. At least 29
jurisdictions allow insurability in cases of vicarious liability, while only 13 jurisdictions
do not permit insurability as a matter of policy. Id at col. 2.
168. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
169. See New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1943);
Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 626-27, 319 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1984);
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 648-49, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5
(1964).
170. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
172. The beneficiary requests a letter of credit primarily to obtain an assured payment
method. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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of punitive damages may deter confirming banks from defrauding the
customer, who also lacks the remedy of consequential damages in this
situation. 17
3
Admittedly, evidence exists that the drafters of the Code may have
intended to preclude the beneficiary from receiving any extracompen-
satory damages. The 1952 Official Text of the UCC stated that "in no
event shall recovery exceed the amount of the credit or the draft as the
case may be."' 174 This language suggests that any extracompensatory re-
covery in a wrongful dishonor suit might violate Code policy. 175
Although deleted from the ratified version of the Code, this clause re-
mains relevant to the debate concerning punitive damages. Most evi-
dence of the drafters' intent supports the conclusion that they deleted the
clause primarily to permit the beneficiary to sue for interest on the face
amount of the draft,'76 thus arguably preserving a Code policy against
exposing issuing banks to any extracompensatory damages. Neverthe-
less, the Code expressly acknowledges the possibility of punitive dam-
ages; 17 7 section 1-106 merely limits punitive liability to claims governed
by some "other rule of law."' 17 1
In addition to punitive damages, potential tort liability also raises the
possibility for an award of consequential damages. Although the issuer
knows it is issuing the letter of credit in the beneficiary's favor, the
amount of consequential damages could be unpredictable and certainly is
not within the risk the issuer undertook in issuing the letter.' 79 Most
importantly, the damages flowing from the underlying contract would
173. See infra notes 178, 184-85 and accompanying text.
174. See U.C.C. 1952 Official Draft in 15 E. Kelly, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts,
22 (1984).
175. By stating clearly that no extracompensatory damages would be permitted, this
version of the Code may have intended to displace punitive damages in wrongful dis-
honor suits. See U.C.C. 1952 Official Draft in 15 E. Kelly, supra note 174, at 22.
176. See ALI & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1956
Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code 182 and 5
New York State, 1955 Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 1705; McLaughlin, supra
note 48, at 6, col. 2.
177. See U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977).
178. See id.
179. See H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 108-09. In a customer-issuer suit, however, con-
sequential damages are a possibility. Traditionally, if the issuer wrongfully honored, the
customer merely had the right to refuse to reimburse the issuer or to force the issuer to
return any prepayment or security the customer had paid. See H. Harfield, supra note 6,
at 105-06. Because the customer and issuer have a common law contract, however, it
may be reasonable to impose consequential damages against the bank, as long as the
foreseeability requirements of contract law are met. See supra notes 112-15 and accom-
panying text. But see H. Harfield, supra note 6, at 108-09 (imposing consequential dam-
ages against the issuer would inject too much uncertainty into letters of credit); J. White
& R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-7, at 742-43 (the best customer could hope for would
be damages for the entire amount of the draft). It is conceivable that even when an issuer
wrongfully honors, the customer might suffer no consequential damages. See J. White &
R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-7, at 740-41. Possibly, the goods conformed with the
underlying contract, even though the documents did not comply. Id. at 741.
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determine the amount of consequential damages. Imposing consequent-
ial damages, therefore, violates the independence principletm by ex-
tending the issuer's liability to circumstances necessarily beyond its
contemplation.
Although consequential damages should not be permitted, that does
not mean that the issuer should not be subject to punitive damages. Pu-
nitive damages are based on the bank's conduct with respect to the let-
ter,18 1 not on the harm arising from nonperformance of the underlying
sales contract. Thus, permitting punitive liability against issuing banks
would not violate the independence principle.
Without consequential damages in tort, punitive damages may provide
the only deterrent to fraud. The bankruptcy scenario illustrates the need
for deterrence through punitive liability."8 2 If the customer becomes in-
solvent after the bank issues the letter but before it pays the beneficiary,
the issuer has incentive to distort any trivial nonconformity in the benefi-
ciary's documents as a pretense for dishonoring the draft."8 3 Without the
possibility of punitive liability, the issuer would only be liable for the face
amount of the letter plus incidental damages."8 4 Thus, the possibility of
punitive damages may deter the bank from placing its self-interest ahead
of its statutory duty to the beneficiary.
The absence of a consequential damages remedy in the customer-con-
firmer situation also demonstrates the need for the deterrent value of pu-
nitive damages. Because the beneficiary often selects the confirmer, with
whom he may have an ongoing relationship, the customer rarely has any
contact with the confirmer. Yet it is the confirming bank that inspects
the documents and initially decides whether to honor the beneficiary's
demand.' As noted earlier, the issuer's incentive to protect the cus-
tomer's interest is limited.18 6 Accordingly, this situation may present an
opportunity for fraudulent collusion."8 7 Because a confirming bank that
wilfully violates its duties under the Code undermines the commercial
usefulness of the letter, punitive liability promotes use of the letter by
providing the only credible deterrent against a conspiracy between the
beneficiary and the confirming bank.
Of course, a bank's punitive liability would necessarily be vicarious.
Critics contend that assessing punitive damages for vicarious liability pe-
nalizes persons who have done nothing wrong, and thus fails to deter
wrongdoers effectively.8' Arguably, permitting punitive damages
against the bank would not deter a bank officer from wrongfully ordering
180. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 90-105, 136-45 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
184. See U.C.C. § 5-115 (1977).
185. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
188. See Slain, Risk Distribution and Treble Damages Insurance and Contribution, 45
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the honor or dishonor of a draft. 89 Nevertheless, if an officer's miscon-
duct causes the bank to pay punitive damages, the bank is likely to take
action. Thus, assessing punitive damages against a bank may create an
economic incentive to discipline reckless or corrupt employees, thereby
potentially deterring such employees from engaging in fraud again. The
possibility of punitive damages may encourage banks to improve their
employee selection, monitoring and training procedures, 90 thus reducing
the likelihood that the letter of credit will be used as an instrument of
fraud.
CONCLUSION
Although only a few courts have confronted the issue, more litigation
concerning punitive damages is certain to occur. Because of the impor-
tance of letters of credit to modern commerce, and the importance of
certainty to the letter of credit device, courts should be wary of applying
common law liability and punitive damages. When analyzing section 1-
106 of the Code, as modified by section 1-103, courts should apply com-
mon law liability only when the bank has violated its duties under the
Code in addition to its common law duties. Additionally, punitive dam-
ages should only be available when the bank's conduct is particularly
egregious and needs to be deterred. Nevertheless, any time a bank
wilfully acts in a manner that threatens the commercial viability of the
letter of credit, punitive damages should be available to deter such con-
duct and to promote the use of this efficient financing device.
When the bank's misconduct is not ordinary and "without commercial
justification,""19 allowing punitive damages does not threaten the com-
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 263, 271-73 (1970); Insurability of Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at
1399.
189. One rationale for permitting punitive liability against corporations is that it may
provide incentive for a company to more carefully select and supervise employees. See
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 992, 666
P.2d 711, 715 (1983); 2 G. Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 564, at 36-37
(1959); Ellis, supra note 3, at 69; Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deter-
rence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141, 1162 (1983); Insurability
of Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1399. Other courts and commentators argue that it
is practically and economically impossible to eliminate behavior that could lead to puni-
tive damage liability. See Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, 42 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773,
356 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1976); Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 1983); Slain,
supra note 188, at 269; Insurability of Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1399. Punitive
damages will probably deter senior managers and the board of directors because their
professional reputations are connected with the procedures. Insurability of Punitive
Damages, supra note 2, at 1401.
190. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 1983);
Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 992, 666 P.2d 711, 715 (1983).
But see Slain, supra note 188, 271-72; Insurability of Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at
1399.
191. Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 757 F.2d 399,
408 (1st Cir. 1985).
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mercial usefulness of letters of credit in everyday situations. Fraudulent
banking practices are "not normal and. the law need not condone
[them]. 192
Lisa G. Weinberg
192. Id.

